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INTRODUCTION
Advocates of arbitration have extolled the process as providing a
more tailored, expeditious, cost effective, and private alternative to
1
litigation. Citing these numerous benefits, businesses and private
parties increasingly utilize the mechanism to resolve their
2
commercial disputes. Similarly, despite initially viewing arbitration
with skepticism, courts began to embrace the process following the
3
4
passage of the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) in 1925. Today, most
∗
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1
NAT’L INST. FOR TRIAL ADVOCACY, ARBITRATION ADVOCACY § 1.3 (1997). There
are critics of arbitration, however, who contend that the process is more costly than
traditional litigation. See, e.g., PUBLIC CITIZEN, THE COSTS OF ARBITRATION (2002),
abstract available at http://www.citizen.org/publications/release.cfm?ID=7173 (last
visited Jan. 26, 2005).
2
See Frederick L. Miller, Arbitration Clauses in Consumer Contracts: Building Barriers
to Consumer Protection, 78 MICH. B.J. 302, 302 (1999) (“Arbitration clauses are fast
becoming a standard part of consumer contracts.”); Rex R. Perschbacher & Debra
Lyn Bassett, The End of Law, 84 B.U. L. REV. 1, 28–29 (2004) (“[T]here is an increase
in the use of arbitration clauses generally.”); Diane P. Wood, The Brave New World of
Arbitration, 31 CAP. U. L. REV. 383, 405 (2003) (“The field within which arbitration
operates has expanded to cover virtually everything except the criminal law.”).
3
Pub. L. No. 68-401, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–
16 (2000)). The United States Supreme Court has stated that the FAA’s “purpose
was to reverse the longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration agreements that had
existed at English common law and had been adopted by American courts, and to
place arbitration agreements upon the same footing as other contracts.” Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991). Section 2 of the FAA, the
Act’s primary substantive provision, declares that a written agreement to arbitrate “in
any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving [interstate]
commerce . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” 9 U.S.C. § 2. The United
States Supreme Court has interpreted this provision broadly, finding that “Section 2
is a congressional declaration of a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration
agreements . . . .” Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1,
24 (1983).
4
Wood, supra note 2, at 383.
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courts have recognized not only agreements to arbitrate, but also the
5
enforceability of such agreements and the resulting arbitral awards.
An important feature of arbitration that receives considerably
less attention is that, “[a]bsent provision to the contrary in the
arbitration agreement, arbitrators are not bound by principles of
6
substantive law . . . .”
Although parties often draft contracts
7
stipulating that the laws of a certain jurisdiction will guide, “[n]one
of the courts that have evaluated the effect of a simple choice-of-law
provision on arbitration have specifically held that such a provision
requires arbitrators to use substantive law principles as the primary
8
decision-making criteria.”
Therefore, there seems to be a structural contradiction in
contracts that contain both a choice-of-law provision and an
arbitration clause. This Article investigates this apparent tension,
delineates its practical implications, and offers guidance on how
parties and their attorneys can draft arbitration clauses that protect
9
their interests more effectively.
THE STRUCTURAL TENSION BETWEEN AN ARBITRATION PROVISION
AND A CHOICE-OF-LAW CLAUSE

I.

10

Because arbitration is a creature of contract, parties generally
11
can control the structure of their arbitrations. In drafting these
5

Id.
Lentine v. Fundaro, 278 N.E.2d 633, 635 (N.Y. 1972).
7
Interview with Scott Shagin, Esq., in Newark, N.J. (Mar. 2, 2004) [hereinafter
Shagin Interview].
8
Murray S. Levin, The Role of Substantive Law in Business Arbitration and the
Importance of Volition, 35 AM. BUS. L.J. 105, 122–23 (1997).
9
Although there are important choice-of-law considerations in international
arbitration, such a discussion is beyond the scope of this Article. For an analysis of
arbitrators’ choice-of-law decisions in international arbitration, see Rachel Engle,
Party Autonomy in International Arbitration: Where Uniformity Gives Way to Predictability, 15
TRANSNAT’L LAW. 323 (2002) (arguing that arbitrators should honor parties’ choiceof-law clause when determining the governing law in an international arbitration).
10
Wood, supra note 2, at 391.
11
Levin, supra note 8, at 112. There are two basic types of arbitration
agreements. NAT’L INST. FOR TRIAL ADVOCACY, supra note 1, § 2.3. First, the parties
can craft a “future-dispute arbitration agreement,” which is an arbitration clause
contained in a broader contract between the parties. Id. Such an arbitration clause
describes the arbitration procedures the parties must follow if a contractual dispute
were to arise. Id. Second, the parties can create a “present-dispute arbitration
agreement,” known as a “submission agreement,” which the parties draft when the
parties wish to arbitrate a dispute, but the contract does not include a pre-existing
arbitration clause.
Id.
Typically, parties include future-dispute arbitration
6
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agreements, however, most parties rely extensively on the model
clauses of organizations that specialize in alternate dispute resolution,
12
such as the American Arbitration Association (“AAA”). The AAA’s
arbitration clause, which is the most commonly used, does not
13
expressly bind an arbitrator to apply substantive law:
Any controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this contract,
or the breach thereof, shall be settled by arbitration administered
by the American Arbitration Association in accordance with its
Commercial [or other] Arbitration Rules . . . and judgment on
the award rendered by the arbitrator(s) may be entered in any
14
court having jurisdiction thereof.

For a variety of reasons, the extent to which arbitrators are
required and actually do apply principles of substantive law is
unclear. First, although parties have the right to specify the
substantive law that arbitrators must employ, they rarely include such
15
language in their arbitration agreements.
Second, even when parties have expressly delineated their
preference for the application of a particular jurisdiction’s
substantive laws, courts have still allowed the arbitrators to decide
what law, if any, they will apply. Although arising in an international
16
arbitration context, Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer
is illustrative. In Vimar, the disputants’ contract included an
arbitration provision and a choice-of-law clause, which mandated the
17
application of Japanese substantive law. After a dispute arose and
the petitioner sued in the United States District Court for the District
of Massachusetts, the respondent moved to stay the judicial
18
proceedings and compel arbitration. The District Court granted
this motion, and the United States Court of Appeals for the First

agreements in their underlying contracts. AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, DRAFTING DISPUTE
RESOLUTION CLAUSES—A PRACTICAL GUIDE introduction (2004) [hereinafter
PRACTICAL DRAFTING GUIDE], available at http://www.adr.org/index2.1.jsp?JSPssid=
15727&JSPsrc=upload\LIVESITE\Rules_Procedures\ADR_Guides\Current%20clauseb
ook.html (amended and effective July 1, 2004).
12
AAA describes itself as a “public-service, not-for-profit organization offering a
broad range of conflict management procedures.” PRACTICAL DRAFTING GUIDE, supra
note 11, introduction.
13
Levin, supra note 8, at 113.
14
PRACTICAL DRAFTING GUIDE, supra note 11, pt. III (brackets in original).
15
Levin, supra note 8, at 112.
16
515 U.S. 528 (1995).
17
Id. at 531.
18
Id.
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Circuit affirmed, reserving judgment on the choice-of-law clause.
The United States Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a “choiceof-law question . . . must be decided in the first instance by the
21
arbitrator.”
Third, without endorsing their inclusion in any arbitration
agreement, the AAA provides three sample provisions permitting
parties to specify what law will govern the contract and the arbitration
22
proceedings.
None of the sample provisions, however, expressly
23
directs the arbitrator to apply the laws of the selected state. In fact,
AAA’s General Counsel, Eric Tuchmann, acknowledges that his
organization’s rules do not generally require that arbitrators decide
24
cases in accordance with any particular legal principles. Instead, the
AAA empowers arbitrators to apply substantive law when appropriate
and also to consider “the agreement of the parties and the customs,
rules, standards of conduct, and unwritten codes of the particular
25
industry.”
Fourth, many courts have emphasized that parties, in selecting
arbitration, have endorsed a process that is focused more on the
ability and knowledge of the arbitrator than on a rigid application of
26
the law. Such judicial deference is the basis on which many courts
19

Id. at 532.
Id. at 541.
21
Id.; see also Crown Equip. Corp. v. Supplies & Servs., No. 98-3435, 1999 U.S.
App. LEXIS 7876, at *11–12 (6th Cir. Apr. 20, 1999) (holding that the arbitrator
decides what substantive law governs the dispute); Medika Int’l, Inc. v. Scanlan Int’l,
Inc., 830 F. Supp. 81 (D.P.R. 1993). In Medika, the disputants included the following
choice-of-law clause in their contract: “This Agreement shall be deemed to have been
executed and entered into in the State of Minnesota, U.S.A. and this Agreement, and
its formation, operation and performance, shall be governed, construed, performed
and enforced in accordance with the substantive laws of the State of Minnesota, U.S.A.” Id.
at 87 (emphasis added). Despite this clear provision, the District Court deferred “all
issues arising from the Distribution Agreement, including the choice-of-law issue, to
the arbitrator.” Id.
22
PRACTICAL DRAFTING GUIDE, supra note 11, pt. V.E.
23
See id.
24
Telephone Interview with Eric Tuchmann, General Counsel, American
Arbitration Association (Mar. 24, 2004) [hereinafter Tuchmann Interview].
25
Id.
26
Levin, supra note 8, at 124. For example, in School City v. East Chicago Federation
of Teachers, 422 N.E.2d 656 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981), the court noted:
Where, as here, the agreement contains a broad arbitration
clause courts have generally held that arbitrators are not bound by the
principles of substantive law. . . .
....
The reason for this traditional approach is the view that a part of
20
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have declined to vacate an arbitrator’s award as being in “manifest
27
disregard of the law.”
28
Fifth, the FAA, the Uniform Arbitration Act, and state statutes
do not describe the role that substantive law should play in
29
arbitration.
Finally, parties often will not know whether or to what extent the
arbitrators applied substantive law, because the arbitrators generally
30
Thus, it is fair to say that
issue awards without an opinion.
arbitrators are usually not bound to follow any substantive law when
31
rendering their awards.
Parties often specify the jurisdiction whose law will govern in a
32
contractual choice-of-law clause.
Such a provision is either a
separate clause contained in the broader contract or a component of

what the parties have bargained for is dispute resolution based upon
the sense of equity or fairness of an impartial umpire who is familiar
with their problems and who should not be constrained by legal
technicalities. . . .
Id. at 662 (footnotes omitted).
27
See Levin, supra note 8, at 134–49. Professor Murray S. Levin, an arbitrator with
over fifteen years of experience, notes that courts have overwhelmingly held that an
arbitrator’s error of law does not subject the decision to appellate review. Id. at 125–
26. Rather, courts have applied the more relaxed “manifest disregard of the law”
standard, which has virtually precluded reversals of arbitrators’ decisions. Id. at 149.
Furthermore, because arbitrators usually do not support their decisions with written
opinions and arbitral records are typically sparse, awards are “virtually immune” from
judicial criticism. Telephone Interview with Murray S. Levin, Arbitrator and
Associate Professor of Law, University of Kansas (Mar. 12, 2004) [hereinafter Levin
Interview].
28
7 U.L.A. 1 (Supp. 2004).
29
Levin, supra note 8, at 107–11. Professor Levin does note several exceptions,
however. For example, the New Jersey Alternate Procedure for Dispute Resolution
Act requires that all arbitrators analyze cases according to substantive law. Id. at 111
(citing N.J. STAT ANN. § 2A:23A-1 to -30 (West 1987 & Supp. 1995)). This provision is
narrow, however, because it only applies to arbitrants who have agreed to arbitrate
pursuant to the Act. Id. (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:23A-12(a), -12(e), -13(c)(5), 13(e)(4) (West 1987)). If the Act does not apply, the New Jersey Arbitration Act,
which does not include any substantive law provision, guides. Id. at 111–12 (citing
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:24 (West 1987)).
30
Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 387
(1978) (“Under the procedures of the American Arbitration Association awards in
commercial cases are rendered usually without opinion . . . .”); Wood, supra note 2,
at 398 (“The absence of any requirement . . . for arbitrators to offer an explanation
of their decision has become a source of increasing attention.”); Levin Interview,
supra note 27.
31
Levin, supra note 8, at 106.
32
Shagin Interview, supra note 7.
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33

the arbitration clause.
In either scenario, the parties have
manifested an intention to be bound by specific substantive law. If
arbitrators have the discretion to decide awards based on the equities
of the case and are not compelled to follow any substantive law, it
follows that an arbitrator can essentially eviscerate a contract’s choiceof-law provision.
Courts have reviewed choice-of-law provisions in the context of
arbitration. The reported cases, however, generally do not concern
the applicability of substantive law. Rather, the jurisprudence deals
with whether a state or federal arbitration act determines the
procedural law, whether attorneys’ fees or punitive damages are
available, and whether state or federal law dictates the validity and
34
scope of the arbitration provision.
In one of the rare exceptions, Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman
35
Hutton, Inc., the United States Supreme Court did examine the role
of substantive law in arbitration when the Court attempted to
reconcile a contract with an apparent contradiction. In Mastrobuono,
petitioners opened a securities trading account with securities broker
Shearson Lehman by executing a standard-form contract, which
contained both an arbitration provision and a choice-of-law
36
provision.
Four years after opening the account, the petitioners
alleged that Shearson Lehman mishandled their account and sued in
37
federal court for damages. Respondents, relying on the contract’s
33

Levin, supra note 8, at 119.
Id. at 122–23. For cases concerning choice-of-law clauses and the proper
procedural law, see Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of the Leland
Stanford Junior University, 489 U.S. 468 (1989) (applying procedural rules of
California instead of Federal Arbitration Act because underlying contract stipulated
such in its choice-of-law provision), and Security Insurance Co. of Hartford v. TIG
Insurance Co., 360 F.3d 322 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that choice-of-law clause
providing that parties’ agreement would be governed by California law mandated use
of California’s procedural rules of arbitration). For a case that addresses the
availability of attorneys’ fees, see Pinnacle Group, Inc. v. Shrader, 412 S.E.2d 117 (N.C.
Ct. App. 1992) (permitting arbitrator to award attorneys’ fees to movant because
contract specified that arbitration agreement was governed by New York law, which
unlike North Carolina law permitted such awards). For a case involving whether
federal or state law determines the validity and scope of an arbitration provision, see
Flight Systems v. Paul A. Lawrence Co., 715 F. Supp. 1125 (D.D.C. 1989) (applying
Virginia Arbitration Act instead of Federal Arbitration Act to contract involving
interstate commerce because parties contracted and agreed to arbitrate under
Virginia law).
35
514 U.S. 52 (1995).
36
Id. at 54.
37
Id.
34
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arbitration provision, filed a successful motion to compel arbitration
pursuant to the rules of the National Association of Securities Dealers
38
(“NASD”).
A panel of three arbitrators ultimately awarded the
petitioners compensatory damages and $400,000 in punitive
39
damages.
Citing the contract’s choice-of-law provision, which mandated
the employment of New York law, Shearson Lehman filed a motion
in District Court to vacate the punitive damages award on the
grounds that New York law permitted only judicial tribunals, not
40
arbitrators, to award such damages.
The District Court and the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that the
41
panel of arbitrators lacked the power to award punitive damages.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the split among the
circuits as to whether a choice-of-law provision can preclude an
arbitrator’s award of punitive damages that would otherwise be
42
permissible.
Although the facts seemed to indicate a contradiction in the
contract resulting from the tension between the choice-of-law
provision and the arbitration clause, the Supreme Court held
otherwise:
We think the best way to harmonize the choice-of-law provision
with the arbitration provision is to read “the laws of the State of
New York” to encompass substantive principles that New York
courts would apply, but not to include special rules limiting the
authority of arbitrators. Thus, the choice-of-law provision covers
the rights and duties of the parties, while the arbitration clause
43
covers arbitration; neither sentence intrudes upon the other.

This pronouncement in Mastrobuono has been interpreted in
different ways. For example, professor and arbitrator Murray Levin

38

Id.
Id.
40
Id. at 54–55.
41
Mastrobuono, 514 U.S. at 55.
42
Id. The Court acknowledged that the arbitration provision did not expressly
permit the award of punitive damages. Id. at 60. The Court did note, however, that
the NASD’s Code of Arbitration Procedure did allow arbitrators to award “damages
and other relief” and that an NASD arbitration manual instructed arbitrators that
they “can consider punitive damages as a remedy.” Id. at 61. Considering these two
pieces of information together with the common law rule that ambiguous contract
language is construed against the party that drafted it, the Court concluded that the
arbitration provision permitted an arbitral award of punitive damages. See id. at 62.
43
Id. at 63–64.
39
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believes that the decision may “signal a new judicial reluctance to
allow businesses to take advantage of consumers and other weaker
parties by having them agree to arbitration and unwittingly relinquish
44
certain rights.” Conversely, in his dissent, Justice Thomas averred
that the decision was “limited and narrow,” applicable “only to this
45
specific contract and to no other.”
Despite these various
interpretations, it is clear that Mastrobuono did not articulate a judicial
standard as to whether and to what extent an arbitrator must follow
46
substantive law. Accordingly, we must ascertain whether there are
other motivations that might persuade an arbitrator to apply
substantive law.
II. THE PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF SUCH STRUCTURAL TENSION
Professor Levin believes that, “although in theory, arbitrators are
not bound to follow substantive law, in practice, they feel a strong
47
sense of obligation to follow it.” He also acknowledges, however,
that the “fundamental goal of arbitration is to ensure a fair and
48
equitable result, not a strict adherence to the law.” Thus, the nature
of the system permits an arbitrator ample discretion to discount an
49
express choice-of-law provision if the equities demand it.
44

Levin, supra note 8, at 122. Professor Levin’s assertion might be lent credence
by the majority’s conclusion:
As a practical matter, it seems unlikely that petitioners were actually
aware of New York’s bifurcated approach to punitive damages, or that
they had any idea that by signing a standard-form agreement to
arbitrate disputes they might be giving up an important substantive
right. In the face of such doubt, we are unwilling to impute this intent.
Mastrobuono, 514 U.S. at 63.
45
Mastrobuono, 514 U.S. at 71–72 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
46
The ambiguity concerning the role substantive law plays in arbitration is still
prevalent among parties, lawyers, and even arbitrators. As Professor Levin claims, “It
seems that most parties and lawyers incorrectly assume that arbitrators are bound to
follow substantive law.” Levin Interview, supra note 27.
47
Id. Tuchmann also believes that although arbitrators are not required to apply
the substantive law specified in the contract, they “diligently do so” in the large
majority of cases. Tuchmann Interview, supra note 24. Tuchmann’s and Professor
Levin’s opinion has been substantiated by empirical research. See, e.g., Soia
Mentschikoff, Commercial Arbitration, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 846, 861 (1961) (finding that
eighty percent of arbitrators believed they should decide their cases “within the
context of the principles of the substantive rules of law”).
48
Levin Interview, supra note 27. Legal scholarship corroborates this belief. See,
e.g., Mentschikoff, supra note 47, at 861 (finding that approximately ninety percent
of arbitrators believed they were empowered to ignore substantive law whenever they
determined a more “just” ruling was obtainable).
49
Levin Interview, supra note 27. Furthermore, there is no requirement that the
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Professor Levin, attorney Scott Shagin, and Tuchmann all
believe that there is a significance to the tension between a choice-of50
law provision and an arbitration clause. First, there are often major
differences in the law among jurisdictions, so parties have a vested
51
interest in persuading arbitrators to apply a certain substantive law.
Second, because arbitrators have decided numerous cases almost
exclusively on the legal merits, the choice-of-law analysis can be
52
dispositive. Third, parties usually have specific reasons for including
a choice-of-law clause in the broader contract, so an arbitrator’s
decision to disregard the clause impairs the expectations of the
53
parties. Finally, many of the underlying agreements are contracts of
adhesion, so it is questionable whether the parties had equal
54
bargaining power or volition to consent to the arbitration provision.
Since the party in the weaker position might have unwittingly
panel of arbitrators contain any lawyers. Tuchmann Interview, supra note 24. Thus,
unless the parties specify in their arbitration agreement or agree before the
arbitration to include at least one lawyer on the panel, the likelihood of the
arbitrators complying with a choice-of-law clause is low. Id. If the panel does not
contain any lawyers, it is doubtful that the panel will apply any substantive law in
resolving the dispute. Shagin Interview, supra note 7.
50
Levin Interview, supra note 27; Shagin Interview, supra note 7; Tuchmann
Interview, supra note 24.
51
Tuchmann Interview, supra note 24. Mastrobuono illustrates such a scenario. In
that case, the petitioners were able to recover $400,000 in punitive damages because
they successfully argued that the contract permitted such an award. Mastrobuono v.
Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 54 (1995); see also supra notes 35–43 and
accompanying text. Professor Levin also notes the disparity between Missouri and
Kansas law regarding punitive damages and attorneys’ fees. Levin Interview, supra
note 27. These differences are significant because many securities arbitration
disputes in the Kansas City metropolitan area cross these geographic boundaries. Id.
52
Tuchmann Interview, supra note 24. Professor Levin has not had such
experiences as an arbitrator, however. Levin Interview, supra note 27. He states that
in his fifteen years as an arbitrator, attorneys have rarely advanced a strict, technical
analysis of choice-of-law provisions. Id. He attributes this fact to three primary
reasons. First, he notes that most arbitrations are driven primarily by the facts and
not by the law. Id. Because the importance of the facts generally overwhelms the
legal issues, most parties present their case with a greater emphasis on the facts. Id.
Second, Levin observes that when there have been legal issues, the differences in the
law have not been substantial enough for attorneys to assume an intractable position
regarding a choice-of-law clause. Id. Finally, he states that informed parties consent
to arbitration for efficiency reasons and do not expect a formulaic application of the
law. Id.
53
Shagin Interview, supra note 7. Professor Levin cautions, however, that many
of these underlying agreements are contracts of adhesion, so it is questionable
whether the parties had equal bargaining power or volition to consent to the
arbitration provision. Levin Interview, supra note 27.
54
Levin Interview, supra note 27; see also supra note 44 and accompanying text.
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sacrificed a substantive right by accepting the arbitration provision,
arbitrators could be reluctant to apply the choice-of-law clause in a
55
mechanical fashion.
As noted, although arbitrators afford substantive law a certain
degree of deference when rendering their decisions, they feel
56
empowered to deviate from the law in the interests of justice.
According to Professor Levin, an arbitrator’s decision whether or not
to follow a choice-of-law provision is based on two broad
57
considerations. First, the facts and equities of the dispute generally
58
will dictate how arbitrators approach a case. If arbitrators can apply
the substantive law enumerated in the contract and achieve a fair
59
result, they will follow the choice-of-law provision.
If, however,
equity and fundamental principles of fairness cannot be reconciled
with the selected substantive law, arbitrators will reexamine the
60
choice-of-law provision in the interests of justice.
Second, arbitrators will consider the context within which the
61
parties negotiated their underlying contract.
More specifically,
arbitrators will examine the intentions of the parties, their relative
bargaining power in the negotiations, whether or not there was true
volition to sign the choice-of-law clause, and the availability of
62
meaningful choices for the weaker party. For example, Professor
Levin contends that his willingness to apply a choice-of-law provision
would be different in an arbitration involving a contract of adhesion
between Microsoft and an individual consumer than it would be in a
case concerning a meaningfully negotiated contract between
63
Microsoft and IBM.
Although strict adherence to the contract’s choice-of-law
provision would have been disadvantageous for the consumers in
Mastrobuono, there are cases where aggrieved consumers would be

55

Levin Interview, supra note 27. As noted, this was the scenario in Mastrobuono,
when a rigid application of the choice-of-law provision would have precluded the
aggrieved consumers from recovering punitive damages. See supra notes 35–43 and
accompanying text.
56
See supra notes 47–49 and accompanying text.
57
Levin Interview, supra note 27.
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
Id.
62
Id.
63
Levin Interview, supra note 27.
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better served if the arbitrator followed the enumerated substantive
law.
For example, Scott Shagin recounts an arbitration that
64
concerned a construction contract for a house addition.
The
contract contained a choice-of-law provision providing that New
Jersey law governed the contract and an arbitration clause requiring
that the “Construction Industry Dispute Resolution Procedures” of
65
A disagreement ensued, and the
the AAA guided any disputes.
66
builder invoked the arbitration provision. In deciding not to apply
New Jersey’s substantive law, the arbitrator did not consider the New
67
68
Jersey Consumer Fraud Act and issued an award for the builder.
After the builder moved in Superior Court to confirm the award,
69
the buyers cross-moved to vacate the award. The buyers, who were
both experienced attorneys, argued that the arbitrator was bound by
the choice-of-law clause and the general rules of contract
70
construction to apply the Consumer Fraud Act. The Superior Court
judge issued a consent order requiring that the arbitrator set forth
reasons for his decision, including why the Consumer Fraud Act did
71
not govern the outcome.
The arbitrator submitted a brief
72
The judge then vacated the arbitral
justification for his award.
73
award and remanded the matter for de novo arbitration.
The
disputants eventually settled out of court, more than nine months
74
after the dispute arose.
This case demonstrates that informed parties, and even
experienced attorneys, are often unaware that an arbitrator can
deviate from the substantive law enumerated in a choice-of-law
clause. As Shagin notes, “The homeowners assumed that New Jersey
law would guide and that they would be protected by the Consumer
64

Interview with Scott Shagin, Esq., in Newark, N.J. (Mar. 23, 2004) [hereinafter
Shagin Interview II].
65
Id. The booklet enumerating the applicable arbitration procedures provided
no guidance on choice-of-law provisions or the application of substantive law. AM.
ARBITRATION ASS’N, CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCEDURES
(1997).
66
Shagin Interview II, supra note 64.
67
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-1 to -135 (West 2004).
68
Shagin Interview II, supra note 64.
69
Id.
70
Id.
71
Id.
72
Id.
73
Id. The vacating of an arbitrator’s award is an extremely rare occurrence. See
Levin, supra note 8, at 125–57.
74
Shagin Interview II, supra note 64.
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Fraud Act. The builder, the homeowners, and the site were all
located in New Jersey, and the contract specifically called for New
75
Jersey law to govern.”
Although such circumstances are not
representative of most arbitrations, parties should at least be
cognizant that such risks exist and carefully evaluate contracts
containing both a choice-of-law clause and an arbitration provision.
III. GUIDANCE FOR CONTRACTUAL PARTIES AND ATTORNEYS
In structuring deals, parties often have specific reasons for
76
including a choice-of-law clause in the underlying contract. Such
reasons include the desire to maximize the predictability of their
contractual relationship, to minimize litigation costs and uncertainty,
77
and to protect and ensure certain substantive rights. Because of
these considerations, choice-of-law clauses are often negotiated
during the bargaining stage, and parties frequently exchange
78
consideration to secure a favorable provision.
As we have seen, however, if the parties also include an
arbitration provision in their contract, they may have unknowingly yet
79
effectively eviscerated their choice-of-law clause.
Therefore,
assuming that the parties have bargained for the choice-of-law
provision and expect it to have legal effect, it is imperative that the
parties consider whether they truly want to arbitrate potential
disputes arising under the contract. The parties must understand
that the arbitrator is not bound to follow the choice-of-law provision
or arguably any substantive law for that matter.
So, in
conceptualizing the contract, the parties must balance this trade-off
80
with the benefits of arbitration.
75

Id.
Julia L. Erickson, Comment, Forum Selection Clauses in Light of the Erie Doctrine
and Federal Common Law: Stewart Organization v. Ricoh Corporation, 72 MINN. L.
REV. 1090, 1092–93 (1988).
77
Id.
78
Id. at 1093. This is obviously not the case with respect to contracts of adhesion.
79
See supra notes 47–49 and accompanying text, and text accompanying notes
56–63.
80
In addition to the ambiguity of the role that substantive law might play in
resolving a dispute, arbitration proceedings have other disadvantages. As two
commentators note:
In the interest of speedy adjudication, an arbitral decision is normally
rendered without an opinion. Experts chosen by the parties for their
familiarity with the subject matter are rarely experts in the law, and in
any event are not bound to follow the law at all. Though limited
76
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If the parties ultimately decide to include an arbitration clause
and are determined that their choice-of-law govern any disputes,
there are several things that Tuchmann recommends the parties
include in the arbitration clause “to make the arbitration provision
81
bulletproof.” First, they should manifest their clear intent to be
bound by the substantive law of a particular state by inserting the
82
choice-of-law language in the arbitration clause itself. Second, the
arbitration clause should stipulate that the arbitrator is bound to
decide the arbitration in accordance with the substantive law of the
83
specified state. Third, the arbitration provision should state that the
84
arbitrator is not authorized to and cannot make an award in equity.
Fourth, the parties can ensure that they select an arbitrator who is
more inclined to apply the substantive law of the enumerated state by
specifying in the arbitration provision that the arbitrator shall be
85
either a former judge or practicing attorney from that state.
Tuchmann believes that in narrowing the field of potential
arbitrators before a dispute arises, the parties will maximize the
likelihood that the arbitrator will know and apply the substantive laws
86
of the selected state. Fifth, the parties can mandate that if a party so

discovery saves time and money, it hinders a party’s ability to develop
facts. This can be critically important. Furthermore, judicial review is
extremely limited in scope and extraordinarily deferential to
arbitrators. This lack of meaningful recourse to the courts after
binding arbitration greatly increases the threat of permanent harm
from repeat player bias and other fairness concerns.
Julie K. Bracker & Larry D. Soderquist, Arbitration in the Corporate Context, 2003
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (footnotes omitted).
81
Tuchmann Interview, supra note 24. According to Tuchmann, the more
specifically and narrowly the parties draft their arbitration clauses, the less discretion
an arbitrator can exercise in determining whether and to what extent to apply
substantive law. Id. Should an arbitrator violate or disregard an express provision of
the parties’ arbitration clause, the likelihood increases that a court will vacate the
arbitrator’s decision as being beyond his or her powers or as being in “manifest
disregard of the law.” Id.
82
Id. Professor Levin also endorses such an approach. Levin Interview, supra
note 27.
83
Tuchmann Interview, supra note 24.
84
Id.
85
Id.
86
Id. Shagin notes that waiting until a dispute has arisen before deciding
whether an arbitrator must be a former judge or attorney will not solve the parties’
pre-dispute substantive law concerns. E-mail from Scott Shagin, Esq., to Matthew
Savare (Mar. 25, 2004) (on file with author) [hereinafter Shagin e-mail]. He argues:
By the time an arbitral dispute has arisen, attorneys for each side will
assess the relative merits of the case and the potential for a favorable
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elects, he or she can move to vacate the award if the arbitrator did
87
Tuchmann acknowledges,
not conform to their choice-of-law.
however, that such a strategy may no longer be viable in light of
88
recently decided cases. Finally, if a party alleges that the arbitrator
did not follow the contract’s choice of law, the parties can require a
de novo arbitration proceeding conducted by a panel of three
89
arbitrators. Although such contractually mandated procedures for
appellate review could be appealing to certain parties, the process is
90
expensive, time consuming, and not a generally accepted practice.
IV. CONCLUSION
There is scant judicial or legislative guidance relating to the role
91
that substantive law should play in an arbitration proceeding.
Although arbitrators feel an obligation to follow the parties’ choice-

outcome both with law applied and without. Usually, the parties’
counsel will have divergent opinions as to whether arbitration by a
knowledgeable judge or attorney will be beneficially outcome
determinative.
Id.
87

Tuchmann Interview, supra note 24.
Id. See, e.g., Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade Servs., Inc., 341 F.3d 987
(9th Cir. 2003), cert. dismissed, 540 U.S. 1098 (2004). In Kyocera, the parties included
a provision in their arbitration clause that required the court to “vacate, modify or
correct any award: (i) based upon any of the grounds referred to in the Federal
Arbitration Act, (ii) where the arbitrators’ findings of fact are not supported by
substantial evidence, or (iii) where the arbitrators’ conclusions of law are erroneous.”
Id. at 990–91. Kyocera filed an unsuccessful motion to vacate the arbitrators’ award,
and on appeal, alleged at least twenty-five grounds for vacatur due to purported
errors of law and unsubstantiated findings of fact. Id. at 994. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, citing the FAA, stated that vacatur is only
permissible in the narrowest of circumstances, such as when an award is procured by
fraud, when an arbitrator is guilty of corruption or misconduct, or when an
arbitrator exceeds his or her powers. Id. at 997. Regarding the final condition, the
Ninth Circuit emphasized that “arbitrators exceed their powers . . . not when they
merely interpret or apply the governing law incorrectly, but when the award is
‘completely irrational,’ or exhibits a ‘manifest disregard of law.’” Id. (internal
citations omitted). Ultimately, the Court held that a federal court could only review
an arbitrator’s decision in accordance with the limited reasons enumerated in the
FAA. Id. at 1000. As such, “[p]rivate parties have no power to alter or expand those
grounds, and any contractual provision purporting to do so is, accordingly, legally
unenforceable.” Id.; see also Bargenquast v. Nakano Foods, Inc., 243 F. Supp. 2d 772,
776 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (holding that “parties may not contractually expand the scope of
judicial review of arbitration awards”).
89
Tuchmann Interview, supra note 24.
90
Id.
91
See Levin, supra note 8, at 110.
88
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of-law provision, there is no such requirement enumerated in the
92
federal or state statutes or the AAA’s procedures. Thus, in any given
arbitration, it is unclear to what extent arbitrators will apply the
substantive laws selected by the parties or whether they are bound to
apply any substantive law at all. Because arbitrators generally do not
issue lengthy written opinions substantiating their awards, parties may
93
have to divine this reasoning.
Furthermore, arbitral awards are
afforded great deference by the courts and can only be vacated under
94
exceptional circumstances.
Therefore, before mandating arbitration in a contract, parties
should weigh the practice’s numerous potential benefits with all the
possible tradeoffs. Although commentators have discussed other
95
disadvantages of arbitration, they have devoted less attention to the
uncertainties concerning the application of substantive law.
Unfortunately, parties and attorneys often are unaware that
arbitrators are not bound to follow their choice-of-law provision or
apply any substantive law. It is imperative that parties negotiate their
contracts with their eyes wide open and draft their documents
precisely. If parties understand the nuances in contracts containing
both a choice-of-law clause and an arbitration provision, they can
attempt to make their contracts “bulletproof” by manifesting a clear
desire for an arbitrator to abide by the substantive law that they have
selected.
As this Article has demonstrated, however, even the most careful
contractual drafting will not necessarily avoid the problem. At best,
parties can mitigate their risks. The key issue is that parties educate
themselves that such risks are possible.

92
93
94
95

See supra notes 47–49 and accompanying text.
See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 26–27, 88 and accompanying text.
See supra note 80.

